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ZONE OF NONDEFERENCE:
CHEVRON AND DEPORTATION FOR A CRIME
Rebecca Sharpless*
ABSTRACT

The U.S. Supreme Court lacks a jurisprudencefor when courts should
defer to immigration agency interpretationsof civil removal statutes that
involve criminal law terms or otherwise require analysis of criminal law.
This Article represents afirst step toward such a jurisprudence,arguingfor
an expansive principle of nondeference in cases involving ambiguity in the
scope of crime-based removal statutes. The zone of nondeference includes not
only statutes like the aggravatedfelony provision that have both civil and
criminal application, but all removal grounds premised on a crime. The animating principles of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. as well as the rationales behind both the ban on deference to
criminal prosecutors and the criminal and immigration rules of lenity all
support the conclusion that courts should not defer to agency interpretations
of crime-based removal grounds.

Clinical Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The author co-authored an amicus brief
in support of the petitioner in Esquivel-Quintanav. Sessions, a U.S. Supreme Court case discussed
in this Article. Many thanks to Michael Froomkin, Mary Holper, and Andrew Stanton for
providing valuable feedback on drafts of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Our judiciary exists in an age of statutes interpreted by agencies.
Today, courts spend more time imbuing statutes with meaning than
interpreting the common law, and this statutory interpretation often
involves reviewing agency decisions.' In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme
Court has developed a robust, albeit uneven, jurisprudence regarding
when, and how, courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes.2 While some question the historical pedigree of Chevron and
have predicted its eventual demise, for now we must contend with
it.3 This Article discusses the relationship between Chevron - "the de-

1. GUrDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 205 (2006) [hereinafter Chevron Step Zero] (Chevron
is "understood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift from judicial to agency
lawmaking.").
2. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (2013);
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs. (Brand X), 545 U.S. 967 (2005); United States v Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
3. See Aditya Bamzai, The Originsof Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation,126 YALE L.J.
908 (2016) (arguing that since Chevron the Supreme Court and commentators "have misidentified nineteenth-century statutory interpretation cases applying canons of construction'respecting' contemporaneous and customary interpretation as cases deferring to executive interpretation as such"); Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevronfrom Infancy to Senescence,
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cision that dominates modern administrative law" - and administrative adjudicatory decisions to deport noncitizens under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") on account of a criminal conviction.4
Under Chevron, reviewing courts generally defer to reasonable interpretations of the INA made by the U.S. Attorney General and the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") in precedential, adjudicative
decisions.' Standing in tension with this rule are Supreme Court decisions holding that ambiguous deportation statutes should be construed in favor of the noncitizen in view of the harsh consequences of
deportation.6 The reality that interpretations of crime-based removal
statutes often involve criminal law further complicates this legal
landscape. Adjudicators must analyze both the scope of the criminal
grounds of removal and the nature of criminal convictions. Immigration and federal criminal law share statutory terms, like "aggravated
felony" and "conviction,"' and the INA defines both civil violations
and criminal offenses.' The Chevron doctrine thus collides with the
Supreme Court's statement that federal agencies have no authority to
resolve ambiguities in criminal laws and with the rule of lenity, which
holds that ambiguities in criminal law should be construed in favor

59 ADMIN. L. REv. 725, 726-27 (2007) (arguing that "Chevron's importance is fading"); Trevor W.
Ezell & Lloyd Marshall, If Goliath Falls: Judge Gorsuch and the Administrative State, 69 STAN. L.
REv. Online 171,175-76 (2017) (discussing the anti-Chevron views of Justice Gorsuch); Juan Carlos Rodriguez, GOP Push to 'Repeal' Chevron Deference May Come up Short, LAW360 (Jan. 5, 2017,
8:11 PM), https://www.aw360.com/articles/877708/gop-push-to-repeal-chevron-deferencemay-come-up-short (discussing possible legislative repeal of Chevron deference); see also
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-58 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing
that Chevron violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699, 2712-13 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron is unconstitutional because
deference "is in tension with Article III's Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III courts").
4. Cass R. Sunstein, NondelegationCanons, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 315,329 (2000) [hereinafter Nondelegation Canons]. Crime-based deportation decisions are determinations of whether a particular criminal conviction falls within a criminal ground of deportation or inadmissibility. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012) (criminal grounds of deportation); id. § 1182(a)(2) (criminal ground of
inadmissibility). These decisions are different from other types of removal decisions in which
criminal history is relevant as a matter of discretion.
5. The Supreme Court has found that" [i]t is well settled that'principles of Chevron deference
are applicable to this statutory scheme."' Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009) (quoting
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999)); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
448 (1987) (BIA "give[s] concrete meaning [to the INA] through a process of case-by-case adjudication" and has the force of law).
6. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922)
(deportation may deprive an individual "of all that makes life worth living").
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i).
8. Id. §§ 1326(b)(2), 1253(a)(1), 1327 (defining criminal violations).
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of the defendant.' When civil deportation is based on a criminal offense, courts must decide whether Chevron, the rule of lenity, or something else governs interpretive ambiguities.
Within this broad class of questions, at least two bright line rules
have emerged. First, immigration agencies enjoy no deference to their
interpretation of the nature of a criminal conviction, be it state or federal."o While Congress has delegated to the Attorney General the
power to issue precedential decisions interpreting the INA, this general delegation does not encompass the specific power to interpret the
elements of an offense and the scope of the criminalized conduct. If
the conviction is from state court, the reviewing federal court researches state law to conduct its own analysis, without deferring to
the agency's state law assessment." Second, courts do not defer to
agency interpretations regarding what has come to be known as the
categorical approach.12 The categorical approach is the usual methodology for determining whether a prior conviction triggers deportation or, in federal criminal cases, sentencing enhancement." Under
the categorical approach, adjudicators look at the elements of the con-

9. See infra Part II. Commentators have noted the conflict between Chevron and the rule of
lenity. See, e.g., Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1,
38-47 (2006); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 128-34
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 211516 (1990) [hereinafter Law and Administration]. But see Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron
DoctrineRun out of Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or The Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C.
L. REV. 115, 165-67 (1998) (discussing reconciliation of lenity and Chevron).
10. See Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382,385 (B.IA. 2007) ("Our interpretation of criminal statutes is not entitled to deference; instead we owe deference to the meaning
of federal criminal law as determined by the Supreme Court and the Federal circuit courts of
appeals.").
11. See Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918,921 (10th Cir. 2011) (" [T]he BIA is owed no deference
to its interpretation of the substance of the state-law offense at issue .... ); Marmolejo-Campos
v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (refusing to defer to the BIA because it "has
no special expertise by virtue of its statutory responsibilities in construing state or federal criminal statutes and, thus, has no special administrative competence to interpret the petitioner's
statute of conviction"); Michael v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourts owe no deference to an agency's interpretations of state or federal criminal laws, because the agency is not
charged with the administration of such laws.").
12. See Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819, 819-22 (B.I.A. 2016) (recognizing
that federal courts do not defer to the BIA's application of the categorical approach, citing to
the Court's federal sentencing decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)). The
Supreme Court does not defer to the BIA's view of whether the categorical approach applies in
the first place. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32 (2009) (holding categorical approach did
not apply to the phrase "loss to the victim" in the fraud aggravated felony provision without
invoking or mentioning Chevron or deference).
13. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247 (2016); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281-83
(2013).

2017]

ZONE OF NONDEFERENCE

327

-

viction, not the way the crime was committed, and compare the elements with a generic definition contained in immigration law or federal sentencing law. A conviction only leads to removal if each of its
elements is contained in the federal definition. In the past, there was
confusion about whether courts defer to the agency's interpretation
of what the categorical approach entails.15 The BIA, however, now
recognizes that Chevron does not apply to its decisions in this area. 6
Interpretations relating to the categorical approach thus represent a
second exception to Congress's general delegated power to the
agency to interpret the INA.
More controversial is the question that is the focus of this Article
whether courts give Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation
of noncriminal terms or criminal terms with no fixed definition that
appear in crime-based removal grounds. Examples of noncriminal
statutory terms are phrases like "described in" or "relating to." Criminal terms and phrases with no statutorily defined meaning include
terms like "theft" or "burglary," and phrases like "sexual abuse of a
minor" and crime "involving moral turpitude.""
The Court recently declined an opportunity to answer at least some
questions about how Chevron relates to interpretations of the scope of
crime-based removal statutes. The case of Juan Esquivel-Quintana involved the question of whether a California statutory rape conviction
falls within the aggravated felony ground of deportation.' 8 This provision, like all aggravated felony provisions, is a hybrid statute -a
civil statute that has criminal applications both within immigration
law and in the federal criminal code.1 9 Federal sentencing law enhances sentences for certain immigration-related crimes if the person
has been convicted of an aggravated felony.2 0
14. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243; Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276; Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 1678 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015) (vacating a prior U.S. Attorney
General decision that had adopted a novel interpretation of the categorical approach to which
some courts had deferred).
16. Chairez-Castrejon,26 I. & N. Dec. at 819-21.
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (aggravated felony deportation ground); id. §
1101(a)(43)(G) ("theft" and "burglary" aggravated felony provision); id. § 1101(a)(43)(A) ("sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony provision); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crime involving
moral turpitude deportation ground).
18. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (2017). Justices Scalia and Thomas
had been "receptive to granting" review of the question of whether Chevron applies to hybrid
statutes. Cf Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353-54 (2014) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
19. See supra note 7-8.
20. See infra note 34.

328

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:323

Whether Esquivel-Quintana's California conviction triggered deportation turned on the scope of the "sexual abuse of a minor" provision of the aggravated felony definition.21 California law criminalizes
sexual intercourse with a minor when the age gap is three years or
more.' In contrast, federal law, the law of 43 states and the District of
Columbia, and the Model Penal Code do not criminalize this conduct.' The BIA ruled that Esquivel-Quintana's conviction was an aggravated felony because statutory-rape convictions qualify as "sexual
abuse of a minor" as long as there is a "meaningful age difference"
between the defendant and child.24 The Sixth Circuit, finding ambiguity in the statutory phrase "sexual abuse of a minor," deferred to
the BIA's interpretation. In a separate decision, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, one judge stated he would have resolved the
ambiguity in the hybrid statute by applying the criminal rule of lenity
rather than Chevron.26
Before the Supreme Court, Esquivel-Quintana argued that it did
not matter whether Chevron applies because the meaning of "sexual
abuse of a minor" is clear. 2 7 But if the phrase is ambiguous, he contended that the rule of lenity, not Chevron, governed the analysis.28
Following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit opinion concurring and
dissenting, Esquivel-Quintana reasoned that Chevron did not apply

21. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony deportation ground); id. § 1101(a)(43)(A)
("sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony provision).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(c) (West 2017). Under California law, "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the
perpetrator, if the person is a minor. For the purposes of this section, a 'minor' is a person under
the age of 18 years." Id. § 261.5(a). "Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of
either a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment ..... Id. § 261.5(c).
23. Only six other states besides California -Arizona, Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin- criminalize the conduct in question. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A)
(2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(2) (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-07(1)(f)
(West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.345(1), 163.415(1)(a)(B) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-63(B)
(West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 948.09 (2017).
24. Esquivel-Quintana, 26 I. & N. Dec. 469, 475-76 (B.I.A. 2015). The BIA distinguished between noncitizens "who are sexually abusive toward children" and those who engage in
"nonabusive consensual intercourse" with an "older adolescent peer[]." Id. at 476. The BIA
found California's three-year age difference requirement to be reasonable. Id. at 477.
25. Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (6th Cir. 2016), rev'd sub nom, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
26. Id. at 1027-31 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
27. Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, No. 16-54 (filed Dec. 16, 2016).
28. Id, at 41-42.
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because the aggravated felony statute "dictates not only civil consequences but criminal liability as well." 2 9 "[T]he rule of lenity" thus
"requires courts to interpret ambiguity in [his] favor." 30
In a unanimous decision, the Court declined to reach the Chevron
question but accepted Esquivel-Quintana's argument that the phrase
"sexual abuse of a minor" unambiguously excludes convictions under the California statutory rape statute. 31 As discussed below, the
Court has traditionally ignored Chevron in cases involving the aggravated felony definition, even when the parties have briefed it.32 But
even if the Court had reached the Chevron issue in Esquivel-Quintana,
it would not have answered all questions regarding deference and
deportation for a crime. 33 Esquivel-Quintana involved a provision of
the aggravated felony definition that resides in the INA but is expressly cross-referenced in federal sentencing law."' The statute is a
classic example of a hybrid statute. Other criminal grounds of removal, however, have no direct application in criminal law, although
they involve criminal law terms. As mentioned above, noncitizens
can be deported in some circumstances for having been "convicted

29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29-30, Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, No. 16-54 (filed July
11, 2016); see also Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2222 (2013) (stating that the rule of lenity
applies in a civil case that involves interpretation of a criminal statute (citing Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990))); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11, n.8 (2004) (stating that the
rule of lenity applies to ambiguous hybrid statutes); United States v. Thompson/ Ctr. Arms Co.,
504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying rule of lenity to civil statute with criminal
application); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954) (same).
30. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 30. In an amicus brief, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urged that the "question of whether the rule of lenity or
Chevron applies when courts confront ambiguous statutory provisions that have both civil and
criminal applications and that an agency has interpreted is an important one that warrants this
Court's attention." Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, No. 16-54 (filed Aug. 10, 2016).
31. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (2017).
32. See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
33. Case law in the area of hybrid statutes is unsettled. See Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity,
Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REv. 905, 910 (2007) (noting that some Supreme Court opinions
"hint that lenity may well 'trump' deference principles in civil cases ... that provide for both
criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms" while others "hint the opposite").
34. While the phrase "aggravated felony" resides in civil immigration law, it has many criminal applications, both in the INA and in criminal law. Under criminal provisions of the INA, it
is a felony to aid or assist in entering the U.S. "any alien inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2)
(insofar as an alien inadmissible under such section has been convicted of an aggravatedfelony)."
8 U.S.C. § 1327 (2012) (emphasis added). Having an aggravated felony also raises the maximum
prison term for failure to depart from four to ten years. Id. § 1253 (a) (1). In criminal law, the term
appears in federal sentencing enhancement statutes. For example, the maximum penalty authorized by statute for illegal reentry rises from two years to twenty years if the defendant has
been convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. § 1326(a)(2), (b)(2).
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of" a crime "involving moral turpitude."" Noncitizens can also be
deported for having been convicted of an offense "relating to" the
Controlled Substances Act.3 6 A more complete jurisprudence on Chevron and crime-based deportation would look beyond the aggravated
felony definition (and the issue of hybrid statutes) to ask what principles should guide courts in deciding whether Chevron applies to the
interpretation of crime-based removal statutes.
This Article begins to develop a general jurisprudence of Chevron
and deportation for a crime, arguing for an expansive principle of
nondeference in cases involving ambiguity in the scope of crimebased removal statutes. The zone of nondeference includes not only
aggravated felony provisions (hybrid statutes) but all removal
grounds premised on a crime. The animating principles of Chevron as
well as the rationales behind both the ban on deference to criminal
prosecutors and the criminal and immigration rules of lenity all point
in the same direction: courts should not defer to the BIA or Attorney
General's interpretations of terms and phrases in crime-based removal grounds."
The principles discussed below sweep broadly and could justify
nondeference to agency adjudicative interpretations of any immigration statute referencing a crime or criminal law, 38 not just crime-based
removal grounds -a conclusion that conflicts with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court considered whether it should defer to the BIA's interpretation of the phrase
"serious nonpolitical crime." 39 While this type of crime does not trigger a ground of removal, it bars a form of relief called withholding of
35. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
36. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
37. See Greenfield, supranote 9, at 5 ("Reconciliation of the rule of lenity and Chevron deference requires consideration of a number of underlying issues, including: methodologies of statutory interpretation, the respective roles of courts and agencies, limitations on delegation, and
the proper balance between law enforcement and civil liberties.").
38. Scholars have argued that Chevron deference should not apply to other areas of imnuigration law. See Alina Das, UnshacklingHabeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation in Immigration Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 143 (2014) (arguing against Chevron deference to
interpretations of law related to immigration detention); Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: InternationalistPaths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DuKE L.J. 1059
(2011) (arguing against Chevron deference in the area of asylum and refugee law); Mary Holper,
The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK L. REv. 1241 (2011) (arguing
against deference to an Attorney General's decision about how to decide whether a crime involves moral turpitude); Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court's Recent
Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMIGR. L.J. 313 (2012) (arguing
against deference to the BIA because it fails to deliver persuasive opinions or use procedures
aimed at ensuring sound decision making).
39. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 430 (1999).
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removal, a protection for noncitizens who face deportation to countries where they will likely be persecuted. 40 In holding that Chevron
applied, the Court cited the Attorney General's authority to interpret
the INA. 4 1 But the Court also emphasized two unique characteristics
of the withholding statute. First, it pointed to statute's language stating that the Attorney General determines whether an applicant qualifies for withholding, a specification that does not exist in all INA provisions. 42 Second, the Court found the "serious nonpolitical crime"
determination to be "political," stating that a "decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses committed in another
country as political in nature . . . may affect our relations with that
country or its neighbors."4 3 The Court refused to "shoulder primary
responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such
diplomatic repercussions." 44 While Aguirre-Aguirre'sChevron holding
is arguably limited to its unique facts, the principles discussed below
suggest that it was wrongly decided because the statute at issue involved an analysis of criminal law. 4 5 This Article, however, saves for
another day this analysis of Aguirre-Aguirre as well as the more general question of what limiting principles might adhere to the argument put forth below.
Part I provides a brief overview of Chevron. Part II discusses the
criminal rule of lenity and the established view that reviewing courts
should not give Chevron deference to the criminal law interpretations
of the Attorney General in individual prosecutions. Part III analyzes
Chevron deference in the area of immigration law and the "rule of immigration lenity."4 6 Part IV makes the case for an expansive principle
of nondeference when courts settle interpretive ambiguity in crimebased removal statutes.
I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE

Chevron is the "undisputed starting point for any assessment of the
allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2012).
41. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.

42. Id. at 424-25 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1), (2)) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 425.
44. Id.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. Irene Scharf, Un-Torturing the Definition of Torture and Employing the Rule of Immigration
Lenity, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 30 (2013) (discussing the "rule of immigration lenity"); see also
Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478,489 (2012) (referring to a "rule of lenity" in the deportation
context).
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agencies."" The case has been aptly described as a modem limitation
on the Marbury v. Madison principle that the law is for the courts to
decide.' By shifting interpretative authority from the courts to the
executive branch, Chevron reallocates the division of powers in our
tripartite government. 49
The Chevron framework involves a familiar two-step inquiry for
courts reviewing agency interpretations of the statutes they are
charged with administering." Courts first ask whether Congress has
"directly spoken to the precise question at issue," such that the intent
of Congress is unambiguous." If, after application of norms of statutory interpretation, the meaning of the statute is ambiguous, courts
proceed to the second part of the inquiry. This step asks whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable. 52 An important threshold question is whether the Chevron framework even applies in the first place.
Scholars have dubbed this inquiry "Chevron step zero."" Cass Sunstein argues that "well-established background principles operate to
'trump' Chevron."5 ' These rules include the canon to construe statutes
to avoid serious constitutional issues and the presumption against the
retroactive application of law.5 5

&

47. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1, at 188.
48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See generally Aditya Bamzai, Marbury v.
Madison and the Concept of Judicial Deference, 81 Mo. L. REv. 1057 (2016) (discussing the tension
bertween Marburyand Chevron); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say
What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589 (2006) (describing Chevron as "a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state").
49. See generally Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Sunstein, Law and
Administration,supra note 9; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power In
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989).
50. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
51. Id. at 843.
52. Id.
53. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1, at 244. But see Matthew C. Stephenson
Adrian Verneule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009). Sunstein credits Thomas
W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman for the "step zero" phrase. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra
note 1, at 191 n.19 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 836 (2001)).
54. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1, at 244.
55. Id.; see also Kenneth Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 75-78 (2008) (discussing statutory construction canons in the context
of Chevron). Commentators disagree about whether the rule of lenity operates at step zero or at
a later point in the Chevron analysis. See Greenfield, supra note 9, at 10-14 (discussing the disagreement).

2017]

ZONE OFNONDEFERENCE

333

At issue in Chevron was the proper method for reviewing the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") definition of the term "stationary source" under the Clean Air Act." The agency opted to interpret the term as encompassing an entire plant or factory, as opposed
to each constitutive part generating pollution. Because the statute
was ambiguous, the Court held that the EPA could define "stationary
source" as it thought best, as long as it was reasonable. By ruling in
favor of the EPA, the Court permitted the agency to enforce an expansive reading of the Clean Air Act's anti-pollution provisions.
Since the Supreme Court decided Chevron over twenty years ago,
courts and scholars have analyzed its jurisprudential underpinnings,
including concerns about expertise, political accountability, and delegation.5 9 The Court recognized that agencies might have more expertise with the statute they were entrusted to implement, such that
Congress could have intended "that those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be
in a better position [than Congress itself] to do so."6 0 The Court also
suggested that agencies are more politically accountable than the judiciary, noting that although "agencies are not directly accountable
to the people, the Chief Executive is." 6 1 Settling statutory ambiguity,
in this view, is akin to making policy, and the separation of powers
requires that policy decisions fall within the democratically elected
executive branch, not the judiciary.

56. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 866.
59. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DuKE L.J. 549, 566-71 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Matthew C.
Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,ProceduralFormality, and Judicial
Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 553 (2006); Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 206-07
(2004); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 53;
Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002);
Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, supra note 4; John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and Judicial Deference to Agency
InterpretationsofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996); Paulsen, supra note 49; Merrill, supra
note 49; Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 9; Farina, supra note 49; Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Role of Constitutionaland Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1985).
60. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
61. Id.
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More recently, cases and commentary have focused on the idea that
62
Chevron deference is concerned with delegation. Courts should defer to agencies when Congress has instructed them to do so. When it
leaves ambiguity in a statute, Congress delegates interpretive authority to agencies. 63 In United States v. Mead, when determining whether
deference was appropriate, the Supreme Court asked whether the
agency had issued the particular rule or adjudication "with the force
of law."' In subsequent decisions, the Court interpreted Mead's delegation inquiry in ways that reflected a historical debate between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia. 65 Justice Scalia favored a bright line test
for determining whether the Chevron framework applies, whereas
Justice Breyer has espoused a multi-factor approach that is reminis66
cent of the pre-Chevron approach taken in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Post-Mead, a key question is whether assessing delegation involves
looking only at the source of the agency interpretation (e.g., a regulation or adjudication as opposed to policies set out in memoranda) or
also at the nature of the interpretive question (e.g., whether it involves a major question or an everyday adjudication within the
agency's expertise).67
II. CRIMINAL LAW AND LENITY
Whatever the precise contours of Chevron's "domain," one established rule is that courts never defer to the Attorney General's interpretation of ambiguous criminal law statutes in individual criminal

62. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) ("Chevron deference, however, is not
accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is involved. To
begin with, the rule must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the
official."); United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001) (" [A]dministrative implementation
of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.");
see generally David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 212-225; Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271 (2008); Ernest
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, ControllingChevron-BasedDelegations, 20 CARDOZo L. REV. 989 (1999);
Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of The Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive's Power to Make and
Interpret Law, 44 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 141 (2012); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 53.
63. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-844) (holding
that when Congress has "explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation").
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 229.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
65 S. Ct. 161 (1944). See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying discussion.
See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying discussion.
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prosecutions.68 Underlying this prohibition is the constitutional concern that "the Due Process Clause limits the extent to which prosecutorial and other functions may be combined in a single actor." 69 Sunstein calls "preposterous" the suggestion that courts defer to prosecutorial interpretations.7 0 "Such deference," he warns, "would ensure
the combination of prosecutorial power and adjudicatory power in a
way that would violate established traditions and threaten liberty itself."' Even those who favor Chevron deference to agencies tasked
with administering civil statutes that have criminal application might
agree that the judiciary should not defer to the Attorney General in
his role as the country's prosecutor-in-chief.7 2
The rule of lenity, not Chevron deference, governs the resolution of
ambiguities in criminal law.73 Under the rule of lenity, ambiguities
are construed in favor of the defendant. 74 Justice Scalia famously argued that giving executive officials the power to "create (and uncreate) new crimes at will, so long as they do not roam beyond ambiguities that the laws contain[,]" would convert the rule of lenity to a rule
of "severity."' The concern is that prosecutors, in an effort to secure

68. Merrill & Hickman, supranote 53 (explaining the scope of the Chevron doctrine);see Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a criminal
statute is not administered by an agency or the Attorney General, but by the courts); Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 264 (2006) ("[I]t [] require[s] the Attorney General to decide '[c]ompliance' with the [criminal] law, it does not suggest that he may decide what the law says.").
69. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1972)).
70. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1, at 210.
71. Id. (citing Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177-78 (Scalia, J., concurring)). But see Dan M. Kahan, Is
Chevron Relevant To Federal Criminal Law? 110 HARv. L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing in favor of
consolidating the law-interpreting and law-enforcement functions).
72. See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don't Call For Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1849, 1858 (2011) (contrasting the statutory interpretations of prosecutors with agency interpretations of hybrid statutes whose administration was specifically delegated by Congress).
73. Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S.
507, 519 (2008); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.
81, 83-84 (1955); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820); see also Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50, 64-65 (1995) (explaining when the rule of lenity applies); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 337-48 (1971) (discussing policies underlying the rule of lenity); Livingston Hall, Strict or
Liberal Construction of Criminal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REv. 748, 749-51 (1935) (discussing the origins of the rule of lenity). In some of its decisions, the Court refers to the criminal rule of lenity
as applying only in cases of "grievous" ambiguity. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453,463 (1991); Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474,488 (2010); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.
125, 138 (1998).
74. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158.
75. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352,353 (2014) (Scalia, J., statement respecting denial
of certiorari); see also Crandon, 494 U.S. at 178 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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convictions, have incentive to adopt expansive interpretations of statutes.' Further grounding the rule of lenity is the due process requirement that people have "fair warning" of what qualifies as a crime and
the idea that the government cannot strip away a person's liberty unless there is no doubt about what the law requires.' Legal scholars
have commented on the tension between Chevron deference and the
rule of lenity, particularly with respect to civil statutes with criminal
application (hybrid statutes).78
Criminal statutes "are for courts, not for the Government, to construe."79 But whether Congress can delegate its authority to define
crimes to executive branch officials is a different question. Congress
has empowered agencies to administer statutes that include criminal
provisions. As one commentator notes, "the broad authority given to
administrative agencies to define the scope of criminal behavior belies any claim that Congress cannot delegate the power to define
crimes."so For example, Congress has delegated to the Department of
Justice the authority to modify the federal drug schedule.8 1 Thus,
while there is broad agreement that courts do not defer to the interpretations of criminal prosecutors, the relationship between Chevron
and delegated agency authority to define criminal offenses is less
clear.
III. IMMIGRATION LAW AND LENITY
With respect to immigration law, the general rule is that the "principles of Chevron deference are applicable."8 2 Congress has granted
the authority to interpret the INA to the Attorney General, who has

76. Greenfield, supra note 9, at 57-58.
77. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338; see NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§59:3, 125 (6th ed. 2000); see also Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158; Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
427 (1985); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
78. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 33, at 910, see also Note, Justify.ing the Chevron Doctrine:
Insights From the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARv. L. REV. 2043, 2061 n.98 (2010) (citing commentaries).
79. Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 264 (2006); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 150 (1998); Crandon, 494 U.S. at
158; Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
80. Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2420, 2426 (2006). For example, "the Attorney General is empowered to designate drugs as Schedule I controlled substances; the SEC
promulgates rules governing securities trading; and various statutes establish crininal penalties for violations of regulations promulgated by the IRS, the EPA, and other agencies." Id.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012).
82. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.
415, 424 (1999)); see Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 58, 465-83 (2009) (discussing history of deference principles in immigration law).
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in turn delegated adjudicative authority to the BIA by regulation.83
Indeed, the Supreme Court has historically applied a form of superdeference to immigration questions in light of the plenary power doctrine, which empowered Congress and the executive branch to act
with unfettered authority in the area of immigration.8
The story, however, is not so simple. Just as criminal law jurisprudence includes an interpretive rule of lenity, immigration law has a
"longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in
deportation statutes in favor of the alien." 85 With origins in early deportation cases, this "rule of immigration lenity" aims to protect
noncitizens from deportation in cases where the meaning of a statutory provision is not clear. 86 The rule stems from the Court's
longstanding recognition that "deportation is a drastic measure and
at times the equivalent of banishment or exile." 87 The Court has not
directly addressed the relationship between Chevron and the presumption in favor of lenity.'

83. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2016); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("A very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment i[s]
express congressional authorization to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations .... ). The BIA issues both precedential and non-precedential decisions.
See 8 C.F.R. § 10 0 3.1(g).
84. For a discussion of the plenary power doctrine and how it has eroded over the last few
decades, see Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution ofImmigration Law: ProceduralSurrogates
for Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
85. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 487 (1992) (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225
(1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948));
see also Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 489-90 (2012) ("[W]e think the application of the
present statute clear enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted."); INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (applying the canon of construing ambiguities in deportation statutes
in favor of the noncitizen); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (same); Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ("[W]e will not assume that Congress meant to trench on
[the alien's] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used."); Matter of Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651, 655 (B.I.A. 1974) (citing Fong
Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 9); 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE

§

71.01[4][b] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016) (stating that deportation statutes must be "strictly
construed").
86. See Scharf, supra note 46, at 30; Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 489.
87. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that
deportation may deprive an individual "of all that makes life worth living").
88. Like the criminal rule of lenity, the presumption against deportation in immigration cases
arguably kicks in at Chevron step zero-when courts are deciding whether Chevron even applies
in the first place. See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1, at 205-20 (discussing the criminal
rule of lenity as a Step Zero inquiry). But see Brian G. Slocum, The ImmigrationRule ofLenity and
Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 543, 574-81 (2003) (arguing that the immigration
rule of lenity should apply at Chevron step two).
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Further complicating the Chevron/immigrationlaw relationship is
the reality that immigration law intertwines with criminal law.8 9 As
mentioned above, the controversy centers on whether courts defer to
agency interpretations of terms defining the scope of a crime-based
removal ground. 90 The terms and phrases divide into four basic categories: (1) those involving interpretation of a term or phrase expressly
defined in a federal criminal statute, like "crime of violence;" (2) those
employing a general criminal law term, like "conviction," "burglary,"
or "theft;" (3) those describing a category of offenses, like "sexual
abuse of a minor" or "crime involving moral turpitude;" and (4) those
relating to statutory terms that have no distinct criminal law meaning, like "described in," or "relating to," or "involving." 91 While some
of these statutory terms are part of the aggravated felony definition
the designation that carries the most serious immigration consequences and also appears in federal criminal law - others are not.9
As to the first category, cross-referenced terms, courts agree that
Chevron has no bearing. 93 The U.S. Attorney General has recognized
that "courts do not afford Chevron deference to the Board's interpretation of a criminal provision incorporated by reference into the
INA." 94 "Incorporated," in this view, means expressly cross-referenced by statute number. The Supreme Court routinely reviews this
type of case with no mention of Chevron deference. 95

89. Yafang Deng, When Procedure Equals Justice: Facing the Pressing ConstitutionalNeeds ofa
CriminalizedImmigration System, 42 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 261, 261, 284-85 (2008).
90. See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying discussion.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012); Deng, supra note 89, at 283-85.
92. Angela M. Banks, DeportingFamilies: Legal Matter or PoliticalQuestion?, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 489, 506 n.68 (2011).
93. See Zivkovic v. Holder, 724 F.3d 894, 897-98 (7th Cir. 2013) ("No one thinks that the
Board of Immigration Appeals has the authority to set the boundaries of the term 'crime of
violence' for every criminal prosecution in the United States; the great majority of these cases
are entirely unrelated to immigration law."); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir.
2001) (reviewing without Chevron deference the meaning of "crime of violence" as defined in
federal criminal law).
94. Brief for the Petitioner at 24, Lynch v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (filed Nov. 14, 2016), 2016
WL 6768940, at *24; see also Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 385 (B.I.A. 2007)
(recognizing that no deference is due the BIA's interpretation of criminal statutes).
95. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 5 (2004) (considering whether a Florida conviction for
driving while intoxicated qualified as a "crime of violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, and,
therefore, an aggravated felony); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (considering
whether a Georgia statute penalizing possession of marijuana with intent to distribute qualified
as an aggravated felony as "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance" as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (considering whether two misdemeanor Texas drug offenses constituted a "drug trafficking" aggravated felony as defined by
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801).
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The same reasoning holds true for the second category -criminal
terms for which there is no cross-referenced federal criminal definition. When faced with interpreting the term "burglary," for example,
the Court in Taylor v. United States defined the term "generically" by
surveying the laws of the states, federal law, and the Model Penal
Code.96 The BIA and courts have imported this definition of burglary
into immigration law.97
Terms and phrases that describe a group of offenses or that have
no settled meaning in criminal law are more controversial. 9 8 EsquivelQuintanaillustrates the controversy of this type of interpretive question, addressing the meaning of "sexual abuse of a minor" in the aggravated felony definition.9 9 Esquivel-Quintana argued, and the
Court agreed, that the unambiguous meaning of "sexual abuse of a
minor" emerges from the interpretive approach employed in Taylorsurveying federal law, state law, and the Model Penal Code.' 00 The
phrase "sexual abuse of a minor," in the Court's view, is a generic
term like "burglary" in Taylor.' The Court rejected the government's
contention that the phrase does not describe a generic crime but a category of offenses appropriate for Chevron deference.102
Esquivel-Quintanainvolved the aggravated felony definition, a hybrid statute. 103 But interpretive questions relating to non-aggravated
felonies present an even closer question, as these grounds have no
criminal law application. The Supreme Court has suggested -albeit
briefly - that Chevron is relevant in such cases, at least with respect to
statutory terms that have no distinct criminal law meaning (the fourth
category above).1" In Mellouli v. Lynch, the Court interpreted the
phrase "relating to" in the controlled substance criminal deportation
96. 495 U.S. 575,580, 598 (1990).
97. Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000); Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d
788, 792 (5th Cir. 2000); Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2000); Matter of
Perez, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1325, 1326-27 (B.I.A. 2000).
98. Compare Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 477 (3d Cir. 2009) (choosing not to defer
to the U.S. Attorney General's definition of "crime involving moral turpitude"), with Smalley v.
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2003) (granting deference to the BIA's definition of
"crime involving moral turpitude").

99. See Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
100. Id. at 1568; see also Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (declining to defer to the BIA's interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor").
101. Esquivel-Quintana,137 S. Ct. at 1571.
102. Id. at 1572; see also Brief for Respondent, Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, No. 16-54 (filed
Jan. 18, 2017), 2017 WL 345128, at *9-12.
103. Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d at 1019, 1020 (6th Cir. 2016), rev'd sub nom Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
104. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015).
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ground.10 s At issue was whether a Kansas misdemeanor for possession of drug paraphernalia constituted a deportable drug offense under a provision that authorizes the removal of a noncitizen "convicted
of a violation of ... any law or regulation of a State, the United States,
or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in
[the federal Controlled Substances Act])." 106 The Court held that the
Kansas paraphernalia conviction was not a deportable offense because the Kansas drug schedule was broader than the one described
in the Controlled Substances Act. 107 The Court reasoned that the paraphernalia conviction did not necessarily "relate to" a federal controlled substance because it could have related to a substance criminalized by Kansas, but not federal, law.'"0 Characterizing the BIA's
contrary interpretation as "ma[king] scant sense," the Court found
the agency was "owed no deference under the doctrine described in
Chevron."" The Court thus appeared to engage in a step two Chevron
inquiry, rejecting the BIA's interpretation of an ambiguous statute as
unreasonable. 11 0 The Court's brief reasoning did not reveal why it believed Chevron was relevant.1
Apart from Mellouli, the Court has ignored Chevron when interpreting crime-based removal statutes. 12 In cases involving aggravated
felony provisions, the Court has neither referred to Chevron nor deferred to the agency, even when Chevron was briefed by the parties."'

&

105. Id. at 1989-90.
106. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012)) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1990-91 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 802(6)).
108. Id. at 1991.
109. Id. at 1989.
110. Id. at 1990-91.
111. Id. at 1989-91.
112. Michael Kagan, Chevron's Immigration Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE
COMMENT (June 10, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-michael-kagan/. Empirical studies of how often the Supreme Court and U.S. courts of
appeals invoke Chevron show that the Supreme Court is much less likely to defer under Chevron
than lower courts, see Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts,
115 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6) (Ohio St. Pub. L., Working Paper No.
359).
113. See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (interpreting the words "described in" in an
aggravated felony provision without reference to Chevron or deference principles); see also Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478,489 (2012) (deciding the case without reference to Chevron and
implying that the rule of lenity, not Chevron, was relevant); Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 50, 60
(2006) (interpreting the term "felony punishable" in the phrase "felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act" without mentioning Chevron, despite it having been briefed).
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Lower courts, in contrast, have often deferred to the agency's interpretations of aggravated felony provisions without first questioning
whether deference is appropriate. 114
The Court has not yet developed a jurisprudence addressing when,
if ever, Chevron applies to interpretations of crime-based removal
grounds. While there is general agreement that some ambiguity in the
criminal grounds of deportation is for courts alone to settle, there is
persistent confusion about which questions fall into this category.
The different types of terms and phrases needing interpretation - and
the cross-cutting issue of whether Chevron applies to deportation statutes that have criminal application (e.g., the aggravated felony definition) - complicate the question of whether Chevron applies in any
given scenario. The Court is in sore need of guidance in the area of
Chevron and deportation for a crime.
IV. TOWARD A CHEVRON JURISPRUDENCE FOR CRIME-BASED
DEPORTATION

The grounding for a jurisprudence of agency deference and deportation lies in the rationales undergirding Chevron as well as concerns
about institutional overreach, morality, lenity, and fair notice -concerns underlying the ban on deference to prosecutors and the criminal and immigration rules of lenity. These tenets support an expansive zone of nondeference that extends beyond hybrid statutes like
the aggravated felony definition. As discussed earlier, Chevron rests
on ideas of agency expertise, political accountability, and delegation."' Each of these concerns supports nondeference to agency statutory interpretations in the area of deportation for a crime.

114. See Spacek v. Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2012) (according "substantial deference" to the BIA's statutory interpretation of "described in," and not addressing the criminal
rule of lenity); Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 681, 684-85 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that
Chevron applies but withholding determination of "the precise degree of deference to be afforded the BIA's interpretation" and not mentioning the criminal rule of lenity); James v.
Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 2008) (deferring to the BIA's definition of the "sexual abuse
of a minor" aggravated felony provision); Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2005)
("We previously have concluded that the BIA's ... broad definition of sexual abuse for guidance
is reasonable."); Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 515 (5th Cir. 2004) (deferring to the BIA's
interpretation of "relating to obstruction of justice" in the aggravated felony definition).
115. See supra Part I.
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A. Expertise
The idea that agencies have more expertise than the judiciary animates Chevron. Congress often delegates to agencies when it is "struggling to figure out ... [hiow . . [to] regulate things we don't understand.""' Where some agencies possess scientific or other technical
expertise, the BIA's expertise lies in its experience interpreting the
INA, a statute described as a "labyrinth." 117 But settling interpretive
ambiguity in crime-based removal grounds requires expertise in
criminal law and general statutory construction, not the INA.
Deciding whether a conviction triggers deportation involves both
an interpretation of the nature of the criminal conviction and the
scope of the deportation ground. Both inquiries straightforwardly involve criminal law. Deportation grounds contain criminal terms and
phrases, like "theft," "burglary," and "sexual abuse of a minor."118
The phrase "moral turpitude," for example, stems from early American defamation law, first appearing in immigration law in 1891.119
The term still appears in criminal law.120
When determining the scope of a criminal removal ground, the BIA
often looks to the corpus of criminal law or to general definitions,
such as those in Black's Law Dictionary. 121 The BIA's precedential decision interpreting the scope of the "sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony definition-at issue in Esquivel-Quintana-illustrates
how assessments of criminal law pervade interpretations of crimebased deportation provisions. In Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the
BIA analyzed a Texas conviction for indecency with a child by exposure. 122 Because the phrase "sexual abuse of a minor" is not defined

116. See Richard E. Myers II, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: Complex Times Don't
Callfor Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1849, 1858 (2011).
117. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37,38 (2d Cir. 1977) (analogizing immigration law to "King Minos's
labyrinth in ancient Crete").
118. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4.
119. Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1039 (2012); Note,
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARv. L. REv. 117, 118 (1929); Annotation, What Constitutes
"Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar PredecessorStatutes Providingfor
Exclusion or Deportationof Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480,487 (1975).
120. Simon-Kerr, supranote 119 at 1001.
121. As discussed above, the petitioner in Esquivel-Quintanaargued that the categorical approach applies to this inquiry. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text; Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562,1567-68 (2017). The categorical approach falls outside the scope
of Chevron; see Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 2016); see also Nijhawan
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
122. Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 991-92 (8.I.A. 1999).
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by statute, the BIA turned to federal law, stating "[i]n determining
whether a specific offense falls within a classification described in deportation or removal provisions in the [INA], we have looked to a
federal definition." 12 3 The BIA reviewed both federal criminal law
and a federal statute defining the rights of child victims and child witnesses. Under the former, the Texas conviction would not qualify, as
it did not involve contact. 1 24 Under the latter, the offense would be an
aggravated felony.125 In choosing the latter, the BIA said that the victim protection "statute encompasses those crimes that can reasonably
be considered sexual abuse of a minor" and cited to Black's Law Dictionary.1 26
Even the interpretation of seemingly neutral terms or phrases in
crime-based deportation grounds-like "described in" or "relating
to" - often require criminal law interpretations. While these terms
are not criminal in and of themselves, their meaning depends on an
assessment of how they relate to criminal terms in the statutory deportation ground. In Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, for example, the
BIA considered whether a California conviction for being an accessory to a crime qualified as an aggravated felony as "an offense relating to obstruction of justice."12 7 In holding that it did, the BIA looked
to the federal criminal code defining the offense of accessory after the
fact and found that the California statute was "closely analogous, if
not functionally identical, to [the federal offense]."128
The BIA often relies on Black's Law Dictionary when interpreting
statutory terms. In Matter of Martinez Espinoza, for example, the BIA
found that drug paraphernalia qualified as "a violation of ... any law
or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating
to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) [.]",129 In holding that the phrase "re-

123. Id. at 995; see also Drug Law Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1994).
124. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. at 995.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 996. In Esquivel-Quintana,the Solicitor General did not defend the BIA's reliance
on the federal witness protection statute to define "sexual abuse of a minor." It did, however,
defend the BIA's citation to Black's Law Dictionary. Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at *1620.
127. Matter of Agustin Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 839-44 (B.I.A. 2012) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 841; Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
129. Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 119 (B.I.A. 2009) (emphasis added).
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lating to" must be broadly construed to encompass drug paraphernalia convictions, the BIA primarily relied on the definition of "relating
to" in Black's Law Dictionary-a source outside of the INA.'3 0
The BIA's cramped reasoning stands in contrast to that of the Supreme Court, which overruled Matter of Martinez Espinoza in Mellouli
v. Lynch.131In Mellouli, the Court interpreted the meaning of "relating
to" by looking not to the inherent meaning of the phrase, which was
"'broad' and 'indeterminate,'" but to what it meant in "context." 1 32
The Court emphasized the mixed immigration/criminal nature of the
case, introducing it as involving "the interplay between several federal and state statutes." 133 Much of the Court's decision applied the
categorical approach, a methodology that the BIA now agrees lies
within the province of federal courts, not the agency, to define.'" As
discussed above, although the Court assumed the relevancy of Chevron, it quickly dismissed the BIA's interpretation as unreasonable.1as
The Court did not consider whether there were reasons to find the
Chevron framework wholly inapplicable at step zero, as argued in this
Article. Mellouli illustrates how the interpretation of crime-based deportation statutes, even when the interpretation is of noncriminal
terms, is inextricably intertwined with criminal law and thus outside
the agency's expertise.
B. Political Accountability
The second pillar of Chevron is the notion that settling interpretive
ambiguity amounts to the promulgation of policy, something within
the province of the politically accountable executive branch. 36 But
immigration agencies, when exercising their adjudicative function,
may not be as politically accountable as other agencies. The two main
immigration adjudicatory bodies are the BIA and the U.S. Attorney
General. While the Attorney General has authority to overrule the
BIA, he has historically invoked this power only occasionally.' In
130. Id. at 120.
131. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1984.
134. See supra note 12 and accompanying discussion.
135. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1989.
136. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. For a critique of the political accountability
rationale for the administrative state, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461 (2003).
137. See Executive Office for Immigration Review: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Sept. 9, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-at-a-glance.
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the last ten years, the Attorney General has issued only 12 decisions,
whereas the BIA issued 319 precedential decisions over the same period. 3 s BIA members, unlike the Attorney General, are not political
appointees.' 3 9 Department of Justice regulations require that the BIA
use "independent judgment and discretion," 140 and the Supreme
Court has held that the Attorney General must abide by this regulation.1 4 ' Thus, while the BIA, as the main source of immigration adjudicatory authority, is part of the executive branch, it is not as politically accountable as other agencies that operate more directly
through the leadership of political appointees.
At the same time, the BIA is not as well-positioned as courts to
carry out the duties of a neutral arbiter. The fact that the BIA is subject
to being overruled by the Attorney General means that it lacks true
independence. The BIA exists in an awkward "middle position,"
functioning as "neither a judicial body nor an independent
agency.""' The political accountability rationale for deferring to
agencies does not apply to the BIA with the force it might to other
agencies.
C. Congressional Intent
Congress intended the judiciary, not immigration agencies, to interpret ambiguity in crime-based removal statutes. Focusing on delegation as the touchstone for deference, the Supreme Court in Mead
framed the question as whether "the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of [the] authority" to make
rules carrying the force of law.1'4 This delegation can be either express
or implicit, but it must be focused on the "particular statutory provision" at issue.'" Because Congress gave the Attorney General (and,

138. See Attorney General and BIA Precedent Decisions, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions (last updated Mar. 2, 2017).
139. However, the BIA is not insulated from politics. In 2001, a group of BIA board members
were removed in a process that was widely criticized as political. See Jason Dzubow, Former BIA
ChairmanPaul W Schmidt on His Career, the Board, and the Purge (part2), ILW.COM: DIsCUSSION
BOARD (Oct. 5,2016,10:53 AM), http://blogs.ilw.com/entry.php?9484-Former-BIA-ChairmanPaul-W-Schmidt-on-His-Career-the-Board-and-the-Purge-(part-2); Stephen H. Legomsky, RestructuringImmigrationAdjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1666 (2010). For a discussion of how federal courts have criticized the quality of BIA decisions, see Rana, supra note 38, at 326 & n.64.
140 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2016).
141. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954).
142. Id. at 269-70 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
143. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
144. Id. at 226.
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by extension, the BIA) the authority to issue binding precedential adjudications, these decisions -whatever their content -arguably satisfy Mead's general force of law requirement.14 5
But satisfaction of Mead's general "force of law" requirement does
not end the delegation inquiry. Mead further requires "inquiry into
whether Congress intended the particular provision at issue to fall
within delegated interpretive authority."14 This particularized approach to the delegation inquiry is consistent with Supreme Court
practice in the area of crime-based removal. As discussed above,
when confronted by certain types of statutory ambiguity -for example, ambiguity that relates to the categorical approach or the aggravated felony definition-the Court has opted not to apply Chevron.1 47
These specific refusals to defer co-exist with Congress's general grant
of authority to the Attorney General to interpret the INA through adjudications.
In Barnhartv. Walton, a Justice Breyer opinion, the Court fashioned
a controversial test for the Mead delegation inquiry. 148 The Court instructed judges to evaluate "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the [a] gency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration," and whether the agency has given the question "careful
consideration . . over a long period of time." 14 9 This multi-factor test
contrasts with the bright line rule favored by Justice Scalia, who read
145. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to
Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedingsin Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 620
(2004). But see Mary Holper, Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1242-43 (2011)
(arguing that an agency decision about the crime involving moral turpitude ground of removal
fails to meet the force of law requirement).
146. Guendelsberger, supra note 145, at 620 (emphasis added); see also Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, supra note 1, at 218 ("The grant of authority to act with the force of law is a sufficient
but not necessary condition for a court to find that Congress has granted an agency the power
to interpret ambiguous statutory terms.").
147. See supra notes 12, 112-13 and accompanying text.
148. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead
Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005) (discussing the controversy surrounding Mead).
149. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD

J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE

§§

1.7, 3.3 (3d ed. 1994)).

As a federal circuit judge, Justice Breyer had suggested that the judiciary take a "stricter review
of matters of law, where courts are more expert, but more lenient review" where agencies have
more "expertise." Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 397 (1986). Justice Breyer's individualized determination of delegation asks whether
the interpretive question is "closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to
the agency's (rather than the court's) administrative or substantive expertise." Mayburg v. Sec'y
of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the multi-factor
test of Barnhart, see Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1, at 231-47.
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Chevron as establishing an "across-the-board" presumption of deference to agency action.150 But even Justice Scalia appears to have
acknowledged that Chevron might not apply to questions outside of
the agency's "substantive field," even if Mead's general "force of law"
requirement were satisfied.151
While hardly a model of clarity, the Court's Chevron jurisprudence - as well as its practice - permits factors like institutional expertise to inform the delegation inquiry. 152 If an ambiguous provision
in the INA does not implicate agency expertise, courts should not assume that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority. As
applied to interpretations of crime-based removal statutes, Mead's
"force of law" requirement, as elaborated by Barnhart, suggests that
courts should not defer to agency interpretations of the scope of a removal statute when it involves the "substantive field" of criminal
law.x1s

150. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 515-17 (1989) (explaining how Chevron creates an "across-the-board" presumption where
there used to be a case-by-case determination); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 241, 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The principle effect [of the majority's decision] will be protracted confusion."); see also
Willaim N. Eskridge, Jr., Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations,96 GEO. L.J. 1080, 1168 (2008) (discussing the debate between
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1047 (2011) (same); Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 1 at 192
(same). For a discussion of how Justice Scalia may have had "buyer's remorse" regarding Chevron such that he was re-thinking his position, see Ezell & Marshall, supra note 3, at 175-76.
151. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (majority
opinion authored by Justice Scalia noting that Justice Breyer in his dissent did not cite to "a
single case in which a general conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held
insufficient to support Chevron deference for an exercise of that authority within the agency's
substantivefield") (emphasis added). Post-City ofArlington, the Court has failed to apply Chevron
when reviewing duly passed regulations on the grounds that the issue was too important. See
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (refusing to defer to tax regulations regarding
the Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare Act because the case was "extraordinary").
King illustrates that the delegation inquiry is not a bright line test focused only on Mead's general "force of law" inquiry.
152. See Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration:When Does Chevron
Apply to BIA Interpretations,69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 530 (2013) (discussing post-Mead
cases like Barnhartv. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) to suggest that expertise remains a central justification).
153. Even if this reading of Mead is overly broad, a zone of nondeference to crime-based
deportation grounds undeniably exists. Because the Supreme Court has declined to defer to at
least some precedential agency interpretations of the INA that incorporate a criminal provision,
we know that satisfaction of Mead's general "force of law" requirement does not end the delegation inquiry. See Guendelsberger, supra note 145, at 620-22. The question is not whether a
zone of nondeference exists but what its contours are.

348

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:323

D. Institutional Overreach and Morality
Other rationales further support the conclusion that the judiciary
should not defer to agency interpretation of ambiguity in criminal removal grounds, including the reasons for not deferring to prosecutors
and for applying the rule of lenity. Courts do not defer to the prosecutors in criminal cases because they have institutional incentives to
read statutes expansively. M The same concern about institutional
overreach exists with the BIA and the Attorney General. 155 Although
Congress in 2002 removed immigration enforcement officials-including immigration court prosecutors - from the Department of Justice and placed them in the newly created Department of Homeland
Security, the two agencies remain closely linked.15 6 Lawyers from the
Department of Justice represent the Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. courts of appeal.157 The two agencies share information through common databases, and officials in leadership positions within both agencies meet frequently and have easy access to
one another. 5 s The Attorney General oversees both the BIA and the
prosecution of federal criminal law. To defer to the BIA and Attorney
General's interpretation of crime-based deportation grounds would
be to defer to institutional actors that have incentive to read deportation grounds expansively in aid of immigration enforcement.
The BIA and Attorney General should not be empowered to resolve
statutory ambiguity regarding crime-based deportation for the further reason that they, like criminal prosecutors, are not moral agents
of our nation. Because criminal law reflects the morality of our community, the power to define criminal terms should not lie with agency
administrators. As one commentator has observed, "[a]gencies may
be experts in their spheres, but they are not the appropriate arbiters

154. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying discussion.
155. For a discussion of whether courts should defer to agency decisions involving their
own self-interest, see Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (2004).
156. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 stat. 2135, 2192 (establishing the Department of Homeland Security).
157. The Office of Immigration Litigation of the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice represents the Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. courts of appeal. Office
of Immigration Litigation: Appellate Section, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
civil/appellate-section (last updated Jan. 12, 2017).
158. See Law Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.ice.gov/le-information-sharing (last visited May 2, 2017).
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of society's moral center."15 9 Agencies should not interpret the scope
of an offense "because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and
because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community."16 0
Although Congress has delegated to the Attorney General the authority to designate new drugs on the federal drug schedules, this
delegation is narrow and contingent on approval by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. 16 1 Under the Controlled Substances Act,
after complying with specified procedures, the Attorney General can
add new drugs to any of the five schedules of controlled substances. 162 Amendments to the drug schedule require scientific expertise in detecting and defining new types of controlled substances, not
a sense of our nation's moral compass. The Court has thus held that
"allowing the Attorney General both to schedule a particular drug
and to prosecute those who manufacture that drug" does not "violate[] the principle of separation of powers."163
The lack of general delegation to the Department of Justice to define crimes supports the view that Congress has not delegated to the
agency the administration of deportation statutes that incorporate,
implicate, or otherwise involve criminal law. Crime-based removal
statutes - like the crimes each provision references - express the morals of the community. Terms like "crime involving moral turpitude"

159. Myers II, supra note 72, at 1864; See also Hickman, note 33, at 923 ("As designated representatives of the people, members of Congress are both more in touch with communal perceptions of 'right' and 'wrong' and more accountable to the public for the moral judgments they
make than agencies are. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly made this link, other courts
and scholars have highlighted the moral element of criminalization as a further reason for not
extending judicial deference to Justice Department interpretations of the criminal code.").
160. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
161. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (authorizing the Attorney General to add or remove drugs from
the schedule or to move them from one schedule to another). To modify the schedule, the Attorney General must comply with detailed statutory provisions, including requesting a scientific and medical assessment from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. § 811(b). If
the Secretary recommends against scheduling a substance, the Attorney General cannot schedule it. Id. The Attorney General must consider eight specified factors and comply with the notice
and hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 811(c). Further, the scheduling of a drug is subject to challenge by any person in the courts of appeals. Id. § 877. But see id.
§ 811(h)(6) (allowing the Attorney General to schedule a substance in schedule I on a "temporary basis" to "avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety," which is not subject to judicial
review).
162. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1970).
163. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (rejecting the argument that giving the
Attorney General the power to temporarily schedule a particular drug and prosecute those who
manufacture the drug concentrates too much power in one branch of government).
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illustrate the connection between removal statutes and morality.164
Like criminal law, crime-based deportation law is grounded in morality -something best not left to agencies to define.
E. Lenity and Fair Warning
The presumption in favor of lenity to ameliorate harsh consequences and fair notice concerns also weigh in favor of nondeference.
In both criminal and immigration cases, the federal government acts
directly on individuals to restrain their liberty. As Justice Marshall
observed, deference is inappropriate when decisions implicate individual liberty " [b]ecause of the severe impact." 1 6s As a result, "an opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker's compliance with congressional directives is a constitutional necessity when administrative
standards are enforced by criminal law."'66
The criminal and immigration rules of lenity reflect the harshness
of criminal incarceration and civil deportation. Both incarceration
and deportation remove people from their families and communities.
Deportation often amounts to "banishment or exile" from "all that
make life worth living."1 67 Although courts have rejected the proposition that deportation constitutes punishment, recent cases have
called this distinction into question. 16 8 The severity of deportation
supports a broad principle of nondeference. 169

.

164. Simon-Kerr, supra note 119, at 1039.
165. Touby, 500 U.S. at 170 (Marshall, J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S.
388, 391 (1947)); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
168. See Padilla,559 U.S. at 357 ("Although removal proceedings are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process"); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1307 (2011) (arguing that Padillav. Kentucky "represents the first step
. . toward a full repudiation of" the view that deportation is not punishment); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make
Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1893 (2000) (" [T]he dramatic increase in deportation of longterm permanent residents .. . for increasingly minor post-entry criminal conduct raises profound humanitarian and constitutional concerns."); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportationas
Punishment:Why at Least Some of the Constitution'sCriminalProcedureProtectionsMust Apply, 52
ADMIN. L. REv. 305, 332-36 (2000); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110
COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010) (arguing that "excessive immigration detention practices
have evolved into a quasi-punitive system of immcarceration") (emphasis in original).
169. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (the "seriousness of criminal penalties" supports the rule of lenity).
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Further reinforcement resides in another foundation of the rule of
lenity - the principle of fair warning.1 70 Unless people are given notice that an action constitutes a crime or is the basis of deportation, it
is unfair to prosecute or deport them. Both lenity and notice concerns
thus weigh in favor of resolving ambiguity in a criminal deportation
statute in favor of the noncitizen.
In sum, the underlying purposes of Chevron, the ban on deference
to the prosecution, and the criminal and immigration rules of lenity
all support a jurisprudence that eliminates deference in the area of
crime-based removal. The above principles sweep well beyond the
issue of hybrid statutes presented in Esquivel-Quintana,as they do not
depend on an immigration statute having a criminal law application.
Rather, the test is whether the deportation statute incorporates or relies upon criminal law in any way. My intention is not to diminish the
importance of the narrower question about hybrid statutes briefed,
but not decided, in Esquivel-Quintana, given that "[a]n increasing
number of administrative regulations ... contain criminal as well as
civil penalties." 171 The suggestion is simply that hybrid statutes are a
subset of a larger group of statutes to which courts should not defer
to agency interpretation. Not only should the Court remain concerned about deferring to agency interpretations of hybrid statutes,
but it should expand its scope of concern to include, at a minimum,
all crime-based removal grounds.
CONCLUSION

Crime-based deportation has existed since the earliest general expulsion statutes.' 72 With the post-New Deal rise of agencies as the
"fourth branch" of government, it is only natural that the Supreme

170. Id. ("[flair warning . .. of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed" justifies
the rule of lenity) (citing McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). Commentators have
noted that the rule of lenity is grounded in part in the criminal due process concerns of the
Constitution. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 600 (1992).
171. Greenfield, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the National Labor Relations Board).
172. See Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 10, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086; Immigration Act of
1917, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. For a discussion of the evolution of deportation law, see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(2007).
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Court should consider how the judiciary relates to agency interpretation of statutes that in some way relate to criminal law.1 73 To date, the
Court has left largely unaddressed whether Chevron applies to inter1 74
Unlike lower
pretations of crime-based deportation provisions.
courts, the Supreme Court has never deferred to the Attorney General
or BIA's interpretations of the scope of a criminal ground of deportation.1 7 Rather, the Court has usually decided this type of case without
mentioning Chevron, even if the parties briefed it." In these cases, it
is often unclear whether the Court regarded Chevron as irrelevant (a
step zero decision) or regarded Chevron relevant but the statutory
meaning clear (a step one decision). Lower courts, in contrast, have
routinely invoked Chevron when reviewing the same type of statutory
interpretation questions.'7
The Court needs a jurisprudence of how Chevron relates to interpretive questions arising out of crime-based removal adjudications.
Even if the Court had reached the Chevron question in Esquivel-Quintana, an aggravated felony case, its holding would not have resolved
the general question of what interpretive rules govern non-aggravated felony crime-based adjudications, especially when the interpretative question does not involve a criminal term with a settled meaning. This Article begins to develop a jurisprudence of Chevron and
crime-based deportation. The animating concerns of Chevron, the ban
on deference to the Attorney General as a prosecutor, and the crminal and immigration rules of lenity all suggest that courts should not
defer to immigration agency interpretations of deportation statutes
triggered by a conviction for a crime.

173. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
174. See supranotes 117-119 and accompanying text.
175. See supranote 118 and accompanying text.
176. See id.
177. See supranote 119 and accompanying text.

